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Abstract.  As computer automation continues to increase in our society, the need for greater radiation reliability is 
necessary.  Already critical infrastructure is failing too frequently.  In this paper, we will introduce the Cross-Layer 
Reliability concept for designing more reliable computer systems. 
 
Keywords: Reliability, Computing, Radiation Effects in Semiconductors 
PACS: 89.20.Ff, 89.20.Kk
INTRODUCTION 
The geometric rate of improvement of transistor 
size and integrated circuit performance, known as 
Moore's Law, has been an engine of growth for our 
economy that has enabled new products and services, 
created new value and wealth, increased safety, and 
removed menial tasks from our daily lives. 
Affordable, highly integrated components have 
enabled both life-saving technologies and rich 
entertainment applications. Anti-lock brakes, insulin 
monitors, and GPS-enabled emergency response 
systems save lives. Cell phones, internet appliances, 
video games, and mp3 players enrich our lives and 
connect us together. Over the past 40 years of silicon 
scaling, the increasing capabilities of inexpensive 
computation have transformed our society through 
automation and ubiquitous communications.  In this 
paper, we will present the concept of the smarter 
planet, how reliability failures affect current systems, 
and methods that can be used to increase the reliable 
adoption of new automation in the future.   
THE SMARTER PLANET 
Recently IBM has been presenting the idea of a 
“smarter planet.”  In smarter planet documents IBM 
states, “With computational power now being put 
into things we wouldn’t recognize as computers, any 
person, any object, any process or service and any 
organization ― large or small ― can become 
digitally aware, connected and smart.  With so much 
technology and networking available at such low 
cost, what wouldn ’ t you enhance?[1]”  In these 
documents, IBM discusses increased computer 
automation of roadways, banking, healthcare, and 
infrastructure, as automation could create more 
efficient systems that could reduce traffic jams, 
increase transparency in the financial institutions, 
increase information connectivity between doctors 
and hospitals, and reduce infrastructure strain.  
Increasing computation, though, necessitates that we 
increase reliability, as unmitigated failures in 
automobiles, infrastructure, medical-implantable 
devices and avionic systems could be dangerous.  
In particular, we have found that with extreme-
scale systems or systems in extreme environments, 
the effect of radiation-induced failures can dominate 
other reliability problems.  In extreme-scale systems, 
such as supercomputing or infrastructure computing, 
the vast number of components in the system 
contribute to increase the likelihood of radiation-
induced failures.  In extreme-environment systems, 
such as avionics, the heightened radiation 
environment increases the likelihood of radiation-
induced upsets.  To illustrate both the exteme-scale 
systems and the extreme environment systems, we 
will present examples from automotive and avionic 
systems. 
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Figure 1: Worldwide mean-time-to-upset in hours for different car memory sizes. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean-Time-To-Upset (MTTU) decreases as feature sizes shrink [shown at a flux of23,082 neutrons-cm2/hour 
corresponding to the flux seen by an airplane flying at 60,000 feet over the North Pole where the magnetic field lines converge]; 
sensitivity per bit (Bit-Cross-Section) does not show direct correlation with feature size. 
 
 
AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS 
One area of recent concern has been the 
reliability of cars. The most recent car reliability 
standard, “Failure Mechanism Based Stress Test 
Qualification for Integrated Circuits (AEC-Q100-
Rev-G),” states that “Soft Error Rate (SER)] testing 
is needed for devices with large numbers of SRAM 
or DRAM cells (≥ 1 Mbit). For example: Since the 
SER rates for a 130 nm technology are typically near 
1000 FIT/Mbit, a device with only 1,000 SRAM 
cells will result in an SER contribution of 1 FIT.” In 
Figure 1 the mean-time-to-upset (MTTU) in hours is 
shown for the worldwide population of cars as a 
function of the memory capacity in each car. These 
calculations take into account that approximately 250 
million [2] cars are on the road every day with an 
average time on the road of three hours. Of the 250 
million cars, we assume that the new cars are more 
likely to have more memory, so the MTTU is further 
rated to indicate that 60% of all cars on the road are 
manufactured in the last ten years. From this graph 
we see that if all of these cars had only 1Mb of 
memory, a single-event upset will occur 
approximately every 3.6 hours. For the computer-
driven Grand and Urban Challenge [3] cars, such as 
Little Ben [4], which can have up to 128MB of 
memory, the MTTU is 12.6 seconds. These 
autonomous vehicles are indicative of the level of 
electronics we may see in cars over the next 10–20 
years as automobile electronics continues to assist 
with more of the driving functions, such as 
automated parking and distance sensing cruise 
control. 
While error-correcting codes will likely correct 
some of these errors in both of these scenarios, the 
increasingly likelihood of multiple-bit upsets, where 
a single ionizing particle creates multiple memory bit 
flips, can make correcting the errors expensive. 
Depending on the layout of the memory devices, 
multiple-bit upsets can be as high as 90% [5] of all 
events. Furthermore, single-event functional 
interrupts that destroy entire pages of memory are 
now as common as single-event upsets in dynamic 
random access memories (DRAMs). While there are 
many error-correcting codes that can correct multiple 666
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faults simultaneously, such as Reed-Solomon, often 
times they require a particular memory usage pattern 
that will make random accesses to memory very 
expensive. 
AVIONIC SYSTEMS 
In avionic systems we have seen an increase in 
the use of Field-Programmable Gate Arrays 
(FPGAs).  FPGAs are programmable devices where 
the user's circuit is implemented in programmable 
logic and routing.  Due to the flexible architecture, 
these devices have always been popular for image 
processing.  Recently, we have seen real-time image 
processing systems being incorporated in unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs).  These systems can collect 
real-time images from an aerial vantage point and 
can be helpful guiding wild fire firefighters to and 
from the hottest parts of the fire or supporting in-
theater warfighters.   
In the past we have used accelerated radiation 
experiments to measure the sensitivity of the device 
to radiation, called the cross-section.  As these 
devices leverage memory cells, the sensitivity to 
radiation-induced failures is similar to traditional 
memory, such as static random access memory 
(SRAM).  Figure 2 shows that while the per-bit 
cross-section has not changed much over several 
generations of FPGAs, the device's MTTU at 
airplane altitudes continues to decrease 
exponentially.  As shown in Figure 3, this correlation 
is due to the increasing amount of memory used in 
each generation of FPGAs. Therefore, even if the 
sensitivity to radiation decreases on a per-bit basis, 
the increasing number of bits in the component 
negates these effects.  Unlike the automotive 
example, the use of error-correcting codes is not 
useful for FPGAs.  In these cases, triple-modular 
redundancy is used to mask the effect of radiation-
induced failures until the system can be reset.   
  
 
 
Figure 3: Chip capacity continues to increase as feature sizes shrink; capacity increase correlates well with decreasing MTTU. 
 
 
CROSS-LAYER RELIABILITY 
In both of these previous examples, it is necessary 
to mitigate radiation-induced failures in electronics 
to ensure reliable system execution.  Unfortunately, 
radiation is only one source of reliability problem 
with modern electronics.  In many current systems 
all of these reliability problems are mitigated at the 
hardware level, so that errors are not observable in 
the operating system or application.  We are finding, 
though, that the need to mitigate all of these 
problems in the hardware is expensive in terms of 
area and power increases tohardware devices.  To 
combat these problems NSF funded a Computing 
Community Consortium Visioning program in 
Cross-Layer Reliable Computing [6] to study new 
methods of reliability engineering.  This program 
brought reliability researchers from many different 
fields together to discuss current and future 
reliability problems.  After discussing these problems 
with the areospace, consumer, infrastructure, large-
scale, and life-critical industries we found several 
key points these researchers converged on: 
 Reliability problems in electronic systems must 
be addressed but the cost of mitigating reliability 
problems is expensive, 
 Information regarding the reliability of 
electronics is hard to determine and often comes 
too late in the design cycle to address it, 
 No single layer of the computing stack has 
enough information to mitigate reliability 
problems efficiently, and 
 The onus for system reliability should be shared 
across the computing stack. 667
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Because of these problems, system reliability is 
often designed as shown in Figure 4.  In this 
scenario, the hardware layers focus on preventing 
reliability failures and the software layers are blind to 
reliability failures.  The solution to these problems is 
to build systems that are designed for repair, can 
filter errors, can detect and correct errors, can adapt 
to changing scenarios and environments, and degrade 
gracefully as the system comes to the end of its 
usable life.  
 
Figure 4: System Stack and Reliability 
 
An illustration of cross-layer system design is 
shown in Figure 5.  In this illustration the application 
layer determines a bound on the value x. Unlike 
conventional systems, the cross-layer version shares 
this information with lower layers. The architecture 
layer can use this bound to detect misbehaving 
hardware. However, the architecture layer does not 
need to capture and correct the problem. When it 
does notice misbehavior, it can signal the the 
middleware and OS layers to contain and correct the 
error before it becomes visible to the application. We 
are beginning to see scattered solutions with this 
flavor. Nonetheless, this approach demands a 
wholesale paradigm shift in the way we design and 
engineer computer systems.  Multi-level solutions 
are not without their precedent in today’s computer 
systems. They are regularly employed to protect 
storage and communications. While multi-level 
solutions have been useful in protecting bulk storage, 
such as DRAMs and persistent storage, similar 
solutions for computation currently do not exist. In 
part, the heterogeneous design of computing systems 
and their ability to transform data makes posing 
simple solutions that do not rely on brute-force 
replication difficult. 
 
Figure 5: Cartoon Illustration of Cross-Layer Cooperation 
 
Moore’s Law feature-size scaling has been an 
economic and capability engine fueling wealth 
creation and quality-of-life improvements for the 
past 40 years. We are now moving into a 
qualitatively new regime where device energy will 
be the dominant limitation for the exploitation of 
additional capacity and where device are inherently 
unpredictable and unreliable. In this new regime our 
old solutions to reliability no longer make sense and 
will lead to an early end to the benefits of scaling.  
However, by exploiting information rather than 
energy to tolerate errors at higher levels in our 
system stack, we can productively exploit these 
smaller technologies to continue reducing energy 
while ensuring high system-level safety.  
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